Messages Conveyed by PLA's Police Patrols and Military Drills Around Taiwan
By Chieh Chung
The Storm Media, April 14, 2023
The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) three-day “United Sharp Sword” military exercises encircling Taiwan ended on the evening of April 10. A record 232 air sorties were flown and, for the first time, naval aircraft were dispatched by an aircraft carrier to participate in a tailor-made exercise for Taiwan.
Although the overall content and intensity of this exercise was not as strong as that of last August's "military exercise around Taiwan," there were still many aspects of the PLA’s use of air power during the three-day exercise this year of which we should be wary.
First, the PLA flew all kinds of military aircraft around Taiwan. 71 and 70 PLA aircraft were detected on the first two days of their drill, with 91 aircraft on the last. This exceeds the 66 military aircraft detected on August 7 during military drills encircling Taiwan last year and the breaks the record 91 military aircraft on a single day on April 10.
In addition, on April 9 and 10, the PLA Navy's Shantung carrier dispatched four and 15 sorties of the J-15 to Taiwan's southeastern airspace. This was not only a precedent for the aircraft carrier to participate in a tailor-made exercise for Taiwan, but it was also the first time that the PLA Navy's air force and the Air Force's flying units conducted a joint exercise in the airspace around Taiwan.
What's even more worrying is that the PLA Air Force sent a total of 232 sorties of different types of aircraft over the three days from April 8 to 10, far exceeding the 149 sorties from October 1 to 4, 2021. An alarming increase in sustained combat capability.
The PLA may have spent a considerable amount of time preparing for this exercise, it showed a significant increase in the combat readiness of their fleet, the ability of their pilots to fly at sea, and their ability to control large air forces of multiple aircraft types in the relatively limited airspace surrounding Taiwan.
Potential Problems with Air Force Exercise
Although there has been a significant increase in the amount of air force resources used this time, the level of combat difficulty and the likeness of its simulation to what actual combat would be like has not surpassed that of the October 2021 exercise. Whether this is due to a deliberate attempt to hold back on their military power display or have they ran into other difficulties remains to be seen.
Despite the impressive performance of the PLA Air Force during the exercise, there are a number of potential problems that can be observed in the course of the three-day exercise:
First, although the scale of the PLA air power strikes on these three days was far greater than that of October 1 to 4 2021, it was not as difficult. On October 1, 2, and 4, 2021, the PLA carried out more difficult day and night strikes, especially on the night of October 1, 2021, when a systematic strike group of long-range fighter and bomber aircraft was deployed under the command and control of an air-warning aircraft to penetrate the southern and southeastern airspace of Taiwan during the night. On the other hand, despite the large number of air forces sent by the PLA, they only attacked during daylight hours and did not carry out long-range strikes from the coast of China into the southern and southeastern airspace of Taiwan.
In other words, although the PLA have significantly increased the number of air forces this time, the difficulty and the level of similarity to actual combat of the exercise has not surpassed that of October 2021.
Second, for the first time, the PLA Naval Air Force's J-15s and the Air Force conducted joint exercises in the airspace around Taiwan. However, when the Shandong's aircraft carriers' J-15s approached the airspace southeast of Taiwan, the PLA Air Force fighter jets were far away in the southwest Taiwan or the airspace north of the strait's median line. There were no signs of coordinated operations. Does this mean that the PLA air and naval forces have not yet been fully integrated in terms of C4ISR? Or does it mean that the Air Force's early-warning aircraft, which act as the command and control center for air operations, are unable to effectively control the naval air force's J-15s? Further clarification is needed.
Third, of the 232 sorties of military aircraft flown by PLA over the past three days, only five were unmanned.
According to the PLA’s theory of warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles will play an important role in pre-war reconnaissance, target tracking, communication relay, evaluation of the effectiveness of attacks, battlefield patrols, and striking sea and land targets. However, during the three-day exercise, only five sorties were unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which may mean that the PLA is not yet able to join UAVs forces with a large number of traditional naval and air forces in combat.
Fourth, during the military exercises encircling Taiwan in August last year, the most advanced mainland Chinese aircraft, the J-20, did not appear in the airspace around Taiwan but was featured several times in the official mainland Chinese propaganda video.
Risks to Taiwan’s Frontline Personnel Increasing
In recent years, the frequency of cross-strait clashes has increased significantly, and there have been several instances of highly dangerous behavior by PLA frontline naval and air force personnel.
Although the overall intensity of this exercise is lower than that of the "military exercise around Taiwan" in August last year, the risks faced by our frontline National Army personnel monitoring PLA aircraft and ships are greater than ever. The frequency of cross-strait military confrontations has increased significantly, as Communist China has continuously sent massive air and sea forces to approach the median line of the Taiwan Strait or our 24-mile contiguous zone over the past three days. During the day on April 8 alone, more than 20 PLA warplanes crossed the median line off Hsinchu, the narrowest part of the Taiwan Strait. As soon as one of the two sides mishandles the situation, the risk of an accident leading to a gunfight increases dramatically.
What is even more worrying is that in recent years, as the frequency of cross-strait clashes has increased significantly, there have been several instances of highly dangerous behavior by frontline naval and air force personnel. For example, an R.O.C. Air Force pilot pointed out that on one occasion, when he was tailing a PLA aircraft on a surveillance mission, the aircraft suddenly made a sharp turn and swept past his F-16 from close range at high speed.
In the absence of any mechanism to prevent military accidents, tensions are likely to spiral upwards in the event of an accident, even leading to a military conflict that none of the parties had anticipated.
(The author is a researcher at the Association of Strategic Foresight and an associate researcher at the National Policy Research Foundation.)